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Tax Policy, Rational Actors, and Other Myths
By Leo P. Martinez*
[Tjax law is always a compromise among the views of powerful
individuals and groups.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Tax Policy is frustrating. I have always been weighed down by the
elusive and, as yet, unproven presumption that there is an overarching
grand design that sees to a rational and uniform approach to tax policy. 2
My naivet6 has roots. My pre-law background is in physics and math,
so I am, by dint of experience, a reductionist-hence, my attraction to
the simple, coherent, and eiegant explanation of complex phenomena.
In making this admission, I am painfully aware of Professor Daniel
Shaviro's observation that "It]he temptation to over-predict and over-
simplify may reflect a misguided craving for the intellectual prestige of
'hard' science, more than a rational choice about how best to put
science to work for us." 3 This may explain the lack of prediction in this
piece.
My naivet6 has limits. I recognize that tax policy is a mess. It is
incoherent, full of contradiction, and works at cross purposes to itself.
It is ill-used, misunderstood, and ignored. The real problem is what to
do about the mess.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Special thanks to
Professor Lily Kahng of Seattle University School of Law, Professor Marjorie Kornhauser of the
Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University, and to my colleagues Vic
Amar, David Faigman, David Jung, Calvin Massey, Reuel Schiller, and William K.S. Wang for
their insights into and inspiration for the creation of this article. The author gratefully
acknowledges the diligent and able research assistance of Brandon Yu, Jennifer Nejad, and
Meghan Coven.
1. JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 38 (5th ed. 1987).
2. My apologies to the many who have articulated the bases of a grand design. E.g., Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1 (2006) (noting that traditional
grounds for evaluating tax policy are efficiency, equity, and administrability); Anthony C. Infanti,
Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191 (2008) (referring to the triad of tax policy concerns:
efficiency, equity, and administrability).
3. Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative
Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 122-23 (1990).
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One of the leading treatises on tax policy recognizes that "the
prevalence of government may reflect the presence of political and
social ideologies which depart from the premises of consumer choice
and decentralized decision making." 4 It recognizes that in a real world
there may very well be no strong connection between the system of
taxation and the expectations of the populace. The subtext of the
message is that tax policy may be devoid of systematic design.
Certainly, popular and political perspectives, along with a healthy
dose of self-interest, have always been hallmarks of modem tax policy.
In this article, I demonstrate that tax policy is a largely mythical
concept, more akin to the Holy Grail than to anything else. Tax policy
more nearly describes an ideal than it describes a normative principle. I
conclude that self-interest, irrationality, and ineptitude explain the
vicissitudes of tax policy in the modern world.
In making my observations, I again take pains to freely acknowledge
that I am biased in favor of coherence and rationality. 5 While I realize
that my bias conflicts with Justice Cardozo's celebrated dictum to the
effect that "[t]hose who think more of symmetry and logic in the
development of legal rules than of practical adaptation to the attainment
of a just result will be troubled by a classification where the lines of
division are so wavering and blurred,"6 my own view is that justice and
just results are better attained if logic and symmetry play a more
prominent role.
II. TAX POLICY AND THE FAILINGS OF DEMOCRACY
Stated baldly, the democratic process is not up to the task of dealing
with tax policy. Legislatures, the executive branch, and the courts have
been demonstrably unable to cope competently with tax policy. This
wide-sweeping incompetence is not limited to the three branches of
government. The citizenry, in its role as collective sovereign-to
borrow Professor Christian Fritz's characterization 7-has also shown its
4. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 5 (4th ed. 1984).
5. A mild disagreement with this thesis appears in a finely written essay. James P. Spica, Tax
Rationality and the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, 12 AKRON TAX J. 205 (1996) (noting
that while coherence is desirable, it may not be sufficient to trump other desirable values). But
see Stephanie Hoffer, Hobgoblin of Little Minds No More: Justice Requires an IRS Duty of
Consistency, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 317 (2006) (containing a related discussion on the judicially
created duty of consistency).
6. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921).
7. CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS 7 (2008).
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inability to deal in a rational way with the concept of tax policy. I
address these failings in turn. Is
A. The Congress and State Legislatures
Neither the United States Congress nor state legislatures have been
able to cope with tax policy in a meaningfully coherent way. A few
examples serve to illustrate the point.
Congress' inability or unwillingness to craft a coherent tax policy is
easily shown by examining the Internal Revenue Code (Code) broadly
and by examining selected Code provisions.8 To begin, tax policy is
plagued by push-me/pull-you issues that act to defy changes to the
status quo. These issues cut across geographical lines, temporal lines,
and income level lines.
For example, the personal residence interest deduction is considered
sacrosanct, and it tends to disproportionately benefit taxpayers with
high incomes-those with high income can afford large mortgages and
their high marginal tax rates maximize the effect of the personal
residence interest deduction.9 It is predictable that a reduction of any
sort would cause consternation by the real estate and financial services
industries.10 Similarly, elimination of the charitable deduction would
create consternation."1  I do not quarrel with either deduction. The
8. An unflattering portrait of Congress is painted in a recent article. Edward J. McCaffery &
Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 1159 (2006) (suggesting that Congress is as much at fault as the various special interest
groups).
9. The Code allows a deduction from gross income for "qualified residence interest." I.R.C. §
163(h)(3) (2000 & West Supp. 2008). The greater a taxpayer's income, the greater income tax
rates she pays. Thus, deductions which reduce income are more valuable to those with high
incomes. Edmund L. Andrews, Bush Names 2 Ex-Senators to Consider Tax Changes, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, at A17.
10. Martin A. Sullivan, The Economics of the American Dream, 106 TAX NOTES 407, 407
(2005); Andrews, supra note 9, at A17.
11. Broadly, the Code provides a deduction for charitable contributions made to qualifying
recipients. I.R.C. § 170(a), (c) (2000 & West Supp. 2008). As one commentator has noted:
The charitable deduction enables people to donate as much of their assets as they like
for charitable purposes without paying a tax. While some choose to contribute to
broad public goals, the law does not require it. In recent years, charitable status has
been recognized for organizations with purposes as idiosyncratic as promoting
excellence in quilting and educating the public about Huey military aircraft.
Ray D. Madoff, Dog Eat Your Taxes?, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2008, at A23; see also McCaffery &
Cohen, supra note 8, at 1195; Warren Vieth, Commission Begins Review of the Tax Code, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2005, at A18.
2009]
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difficulty is that the intense lobbying that surrounds even the hint of
altering existing deductions has the tendency to stifle informed debate. 12
An example of the disparate geographical reach and inconsistency of
the Code is provided by the deduction for the payment of state income
and property taxes under Section 164.13 The deduction avoids a kind of
"double taxation" by allowing taxpayers to reduce their gross income by
the amount of state taxes paid. The difficulty of this approach from the
perspective of a coherent federal tax policy is that there arises a
geographical asymmetry resulting from two primary sources.
First, high value real estate tends to be concentrated on either coast
and in large urban areas. 14 To the extent the deduction is a benefit to
those who incur high property taxes, the benefit is disproportionately
allocated away from the residences of rural states, most of which are
located away from an ocean.
Second, the geographical asymmetry can be attributed to the different
mechanisms by which states raise revenue. To the extent that a state
raises revenue through a state income tax, the citizens can take
advantage of the deduction. In a nod to symmetry, the Code allows
residents of states that depend on a sales taxation for revenue to elect a
deduction of general state sales taxes in lieu of a deduction for state
income taxes. 15 This election forces residents of states that choose to
raise revenue by means of both income taxes and sales taxes to lose the
benefit of either the payment of income taxes or sales taxes-either of
which can be significant. 16
12. Ryan Donmoyer, Bush Tax Plan Must Create Losers, Rostenkowski Says, BLOOMBERG,
Feb. 16, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=aNliMiblphWI&
refer=top-world news (noting that Eugene Steuerle, a senior fellow at the Urban Institute,
suggests that dealing with large deficits creates a similar problem).
13. I.R.C. § 164 (2000 & West Supp. 2008). This is not to suggest that there is anything
inherently suspect with this so-called double taxation.
14. Laura Sherman, America's Most Expensive Cities, FORBES, July 24, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/realestate/2008/07/23/cities-america-expensive-forbeslife-cx-is-
0724expensiveus.html. According to Sherman, the ten most expensive cities are, in order: New
York City, NY; Los Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; Honolulu, HI; San Francisco, CA; Chicago, IL;
White Plains, NY; Houston, TX; Boston, MA; and Washington DC. Id. See also Matt Woolsey,
Most Expensive ZIP Codes, FORBES, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/realestate/
2007/09/12/zip-expensive-list-forbeslife-cx_07zip mw_0913realestate.html. According to
Woolsey, the ten most expensive ZIP codes (based on median home sales price between July
2006 and June 2007) are: Alpine, NJ; Miami Beach, FL; Rancho Santa Fe, CA; Glenbrook, NV;
Amagansett, NY; Water Mill, NY; Santa Barbara, CA; Purchase, NY; Ross, CA; and Chilmark,
MA. Woolsey also notes that "[tihe list is dominated by ZIPs in the nation's coastal states." Id.
15. I.R.C. § 164(b)(5).
16. A prior version of the Code allowed a deduction for all state taxes paid. See Jeffrey S.
Kinsler, Circuit-Specific Application of the Internal Revenue Code: An Unconstitutional Tax, 81
300 [Vol. 40
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To be sure, the picture is vastly more complicated than the one I
paint. For example, one observation is that the taxpayers who are
denied the benefit of the Section 164 deduction realize a benefit in
increased spending for local services-more police and fire protection,
better schools, and better infrastructure. 17  That is, the sting of the
geographic asymmetry is lessened by the receipt of benefits.
A few scholars have offered the thought that tax policy does not
necessarily consider the whole picture in terms of the effects of tax
legislation; it is not comprehensive in its scope. For example, Professor
Christine A. Klein suggested some years ago that the capital gain
rollover rule embodied in former Code Section 1034 had a significant
and unintended effect. 18 That is, Section 1034 discouraged investment
in older residences because it provided that the capital gain on the sale
of a personal residence was deferred only on the subsequent purchase of
a home of equal or greater value. 19 Accordingly, taxpayers desiring to
defer capital gains taxes on the sale of a personal residence were
economically encouraged by the Code to buy more expensive housing if
they desired to move. After extensive review of the effects of Section
1034, Professor Klein's conclusion was that it not only encouraged
overinvestment in housing but that it also had the disadvantage of
increasing the stock of suburban housing at the expense of reducing
farmland and investment in urban housing.20  The ostensibly laudable
goal of the Section 1034 rollover rule of removing an impediment to
travel by the elderly had a tremendously large, and wholly unintended,
negative effect.2 1
DENY. U. L. REV. 113 (2003) (discussing the geographical inconsistency of the Code). The Code
allows the Internal Revenue Service to create tables that obviate the tracking of purchases by
keying the sales tax deduction to income levels. I.R.C. § 164(b)(5)(H).
17. Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, and
the "SALT" Deduction, 106 MICH. L. REV. 805, 813 (2008).
18. Christine A. Klein, A Requiem for the Rollover Rule: Capital Gains, Farmland Loss, and
the Law of Unintended Consequences, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 406 (1998).
19. I.R.C. § 1034 (1994) (repealed 1997).
20. Klein, supra note 18, at 465.
21. Id. The Section 1034 non-recognition provision is not the only perverse aspect of tax
policy regarding homes. The personal residence interest deduction is skewed to benefit high
income taxpayers because the value of a deduction is greater for those with high marginal tax
rates. David Leonhardt, Untangling Housing and Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2008, at C4.
Higher income taxpayers are also more likely to itemize deductions, and so the personal residence
interest deduction is not "wasted" as it is in the case of low income taxpayers who might not
itemize deductions. Id.
20091
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More recently, Professor Leandra Lederman made a related
observation. 22 Based on her ambitious study of the Internal Revenue
Code, she has observed that the federal income tax system subsidizes
entrepreneurs. 23 In the abstract, this is not a surprising or necessarily
undesirable conclusion. It makes sense to encourage business risk and
to reward entrepreneurs for bold initiatives. Professor Lederman,
however, concludes that the system provides an implicit incentive to
investment in business activities. 24 Her surmise is that the apparently
worthy policy goal is not the result of intention but of accident.25
A more insidious form of "accident" is the subject of commentary by
Professors Beverly I. Moran and William Whitford.26 Professors Moran
and Whitford conclude that African-Americans are systematically short-
changed by the Internal Revenue Code for a number of reasons. These
include African-Americans' reduced ability to take advantage of the
Code's incentives for capital investment, the fact that African-
Americans are less likely to be the recipients of tax-favored gifts or
inheritances, and the fact that African-Americans, who own homes that
are generally less costly than the average, do not exploit the personal
residence interest deduction or the deduction of real estate taxes paid to
the same extent as their Caucasian counterparts. 27  If this disparate
impact of the Code is intentional, it is reprehensible. If this disparate
impact is accidental, it is a tragedy of misjudgment. In either event, it
makes little sense, and the "tax policy" involved cannot be described as
coherent.28
Additionally, tax policy does not necessarily age well. What made
sense many years ago might not make sense today. For example, the
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) may have made sense when it was
22. Leandra Lederman, The Entrepreneurship Effect: An Accidental Externality in the Federal
Income Tax, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1401 (2004).
23. Id. at 1407-09.
24. Id. at 1409.
25. Id. at 1477.
26. Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code,
1996 WIs. L. REv. 751 (1996).
27. Id. at 799-800; cf Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue
Code, 34 U.S.F. L. REv. 465 (2000) (noting various ways in which the Internal Revenue Code
disadvantages homosexuals). Professor David Brennan has neatly surveyed recent related
literature. David Brennan, Race and Equality Across the Law School Curriculum, 54 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 336, 337 n.5 (2004).
28. 1 write this with an awareness that, while I agree with Professors Moran and Whitford, this
view is not universally followed. Professor Anthony C. Infanti has neatly summarized the debate.
Infanti, supra note 2, at 1216-21.
[Vol. 40
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enacted in 1986.29 The AMT was aimed at wealthy taxpayers who were
perceived to be avoiding an inordinate amount of tax liability through
deductions and tax shelters. 30 However, because the tax is not indexed
to inflation, it has snared many middle-class taxpayers in its net while
allowing many of its originally targeted high-income taxpayers to
escape. In the year 2001, the AMT affected only about one percent of
taxpayers, or about one million individuals. 31 One estimate suggests
that the number of taxpayers that will be caught within the AMT trap
will be forty-six million by 2014.32 Surely, there will not be forty-six
million "wealthy" tax-avoiding taxpayers in 2014. Unless the AMT is
modified in significant respect, those forty-six million taxpayers will be
subject to a tax that originally was aimed at only a few. This represents
two tax policy failures: the first is the original failure to craft a tax
provision that would age gracefully, and the second is the inability of
the Congress to address the resulting problem.
Individual aspects of the Internal Revenue Code present interesting
policy dilemmas. My favorite example is the tax treatment of illicit
behavior. Code Section 162(c) limits the deductibility of bribes and
kickbacks.33 Section 280E denies deductions if a taxpayer's trade or
business consists of dealing illegally in controlled substances.
34
Considered alone or in the abstract, these provisions seem to make
sense. However, the provisions beg the question of why other types of
illegal behavior escape similar treatment. Presumably, if a taxpayer
engages in murder-for-hire, his or her expenses (the cost of target
practice, bullets, travel, and disguises) are otherwise fully deductible
against the fully taxable income from such pursuit. If a murder-for-hire
29. DANIEL J. LATHROPE, THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX § 1-13 (Supp. 2008) (describing
the advent of a comprehensive AMT).
30. Donmoyer, supra note 12.
31. CONG. BUDGET OFF., REVENUE AND TAX POLICY BRIEF NO. 4, THE ALTERNATIVE
MINIMUM TAX (2004).
32. Allen Kenney, Former Commissioners Say It's Time to Scrap AMT, 103 TAX NOTES 1466
(2004).
33. The Code denies a deduction for three different kinds of illicit payments. These are (1)
illegal payments to government officials or employees, (2) other illegal payments, and (3)
kickback, rebates, and bribes under Medicare or Medicaid. I.R.C. § 162(c) (2000 & West Supp.
2008).
34. The Code's statement in this regard is an unusually succinct, single-sentence which
disallows the trade or business expense deduction if the trade or business "consists of trafficking
in controlled substances (within the meaning of schedule I and II of the Controlled Substances
Act) which is prohibited by Federal law or the law of any State in which such trade or business is
conducted." I.R.C. § 280E (2000 & West Supp. 2008).
2009]
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specialist avoids the payment of bribes or kickbacks, expenses are not
otherwise treated any differently than in any other trade or business.
Continuing this theme, income from drug dealing and murder-for-
hire is clearly subject to federal taxation. 35 Does this mean the United
States is a stakeholder in such illicit behavior? Because of the
limitation on deductions related to illegal drug dealing, is the
government profiting even more from the illicit behavior of drug
dealing? Such are the quandaries presented by even the most prosaic
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
A final example of the perversity of tax policy is the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC). The EITC, described in Section 32, provides a tax
credit to taxpayers whose income does not exceed a threshold amount.
36
Even in my abridged version of the Code, Section 32 runs four and one-
half pages of single-spaced print.37 Professor Dorothy Brown observes
that the Internal Revenue Service publication that is intended to assist
taxpayer understanding of the EITC "is over fifty pages long with six
separate worksheets." 38  The irony of the EITC is that while it is
extraordinarily complex, it is aimed at a segment of the population that,
on balance, is likely to be less educated than the general populace.
39
Moreover, while the EITC serves to encourage taxpayers to join the
workforce and generate income so that tax benefits can be realized, its
substantial flaw is that it provides no benefit to those who are unable to
find employment. 40 This class of taxpayers generally will include
children and the disabled-those who are most often in need.41
The Code's internal inconsistency and its fostering of contradictory
policies has occurred incrementally over time. Even so, this tendency to
contradiction can be seen at particular points when the contrast between
self-interest and political behavior is especially stark. On June 1, 2004,
35. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2005) (discussing how
Al Capone was brought down for failure to pay income taxes, not his other crimes).
36. I.R.C. § 32 (2000 & West Supp. 2008), amended by Pub. L. No. 110-246, §
4002(b)(1)(B), 122 Stat. 1857, and Heroes Earnings Assistance & Relief Tax Act, Pub. L. No.
110-245, § 102(a), 122 Stat. 1624.
37. SELECTED FEDERAL TAXATION STATUTES AND REGULATIONS § 32, at 35-40 (Daniel J.
Lathrope ed., 2008).
38. Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 793
(2007).
39. Id.
40. CHARLES WHEELAN, NAKED ECONOMICS: UNDRESSING THE DISMAL SCIENCE 41-42
(2002).
41. Id.
[Vol. 40
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President George W. Bush and 258 members of Congress signed a "no
new taxes" pledge. The pledge aimed to restrict government spending
by opposing any increase in marginal income tax rates as well as
prohibiting any removal of tax deductions without an accompanying
reduction in marginal tax rates.42 Rationally speaking, signers of the
pledge should have supported all tax and spending cuts. However,
according to voting records analyzed by William Gale and Brennan
Kelly, while congressional signers of the pledge voted for permanent
tax cuts over the last several years, they have also overwhelmingly
voted for permanent spending increases during a period of declining
revenue. 43  Such contradictory behavior is yet more evidence of the
underlying irrationality inherent in democratically determined tax
policy-at a minimum, it illustrates that political motivations might
trump wealth-maximization principles.
As these few examples show, Congress has more than amply
demonstrated ineptitude in tax matters. 44
State legislatures, for their part, have fared no better, and state
systems of taxation are not immune from inconsistency and
incoherency. For example, in Guinn v. Legislature of Nevada,45
decided on September 17, 2003, the Nevada Supreme Court was called
on to resolve a legislatively created constitutional crisis. The case
involved a conflict of state constitutional provisions. On one hand, the
Nevada Constitution provides that revenue and tax bills must pass by
two-thirds majority of the State Senate and the State Assembly.46 On
the other hand, the Nevada Constitution requires both a balanced budget
and full funding of education.47 Guinn involved circumstances under
which the Nevada Legislature was able to pass, by simple majority, a
balanced budget to fund education, but the associated revenue bill
required to balance the budget could not muster the requisite two-thirds
vote.48  The salient point is that the crisis was precipitated by the
42. William G. Gale and Brennan Kelly, The 'No New Taxes' Pledge, 104 TAX NOTES 197,
197 (2004).
43. Id.
44. As amusing as I find this exercise, a comprehensive exegesis of the perversity of the Code
would easily be a multi-volume work. Thus, I use only a few examples to make my point.
45. Guinn v. Legislature of Nevada, 76 P.3d 22 (Nev. 2003).
46. NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 18 cl. 2; Guinn, 76 P.3d at 25-26.
47. Guinn, 76 P.3d at 28-29.
48. The resolution of the impasse does not bear on this paper. The impasse was resolved
when the Nevada Supreme Court held that the "procedure" of the supermajority requirement
would have to yield to the "substance" of the balanced budget requirement. Guinn, 76 P.3d at 33.
More specifically, the Nevada Supreme Court in Guinn drew "a distinction between substantive
2009]
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inability of the legislative body to tackle directly a significant aspect of
tax policy. To understate the situation, the time, money, heartache, and
heartburn involved in resolving the dilemma could have been more
productively spent. At its best, the legislative process is cumbersome
and indirect.49 One is tempted to conclude that legislatures, at either the
State or Federal level, may not be the best place to cure the problem of
an inconsistent tax policy.
B. The Executive Branch
In the same way, the executive branch has been singularly unable to
exert effective leadership in dealing with tax policy. The first President
Bush was forced by the economy to stand by and let Congress raise
taxes to reduce potential budget deficits, effectively recanting his
signature pledge, "[r]ead my lips," a part of his resolute position against
raising taxes. 50
In President George Herbert Walker Bush's case, the needed tax
increase was implemented. Thus, it cannot be said his leadership failed
in that sense. On the other hand, the recantation of his no taxes pledge
essentially doomed his chances for a second term. In a way, his
experience is the most damaging because it may well have convinced
many in the executive branch (the lesson cannot be lost on legislators)
that any kind of support for taxes, however well justified, is fatal-the
"third rail" of American politics in the view of many. 51
Still, the laboratory of politics provides ample opportunity to observe
the practical effects of advocating tax increases. Despite the suggestion
above that President George Herbert Walker Bush's experience might
dissuade state executives from entering the arena of taxation, at least
requirements of the government and procedural requirements of the legislative process." Robert
Ward Shaw, The States, Balanced Budgets, and Fundamental Shifts in Federalism, 82 N.C. L.
REV. 1195, 1226 (2004).
49. CHARLES WHEELAN, supra note 40, at 64; see also Bernard (Bob) Shapiro, Lindy Paul,
Hon. Bill Archer, Pamela Olson, Woodworth Memorial Lecture: The Role of Tax Policy in the
Development of Tax Legislation (May 15, 2005), in 32 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 1 (2006) (describing
the tax legislative process in Congress); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public
Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 1 (1990) (broad and comprehensive analysis of the legislative process).
50. Ann Devroy, Domestic Perils Sink President in Last Campaign, WASH. POST, Nov. 4,
1992, at A21; Charles Krauthammer, Trapped by Campaign Rhetoric, WASH. POST, Feb. 26,
1993, at A23; Paul Taylor, Bush's Vivid Self-Portrait-Caring, Practical Everyman Depicted,
WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1988, at AI; George Will, Deficit Goes Up, Bush Goes Down, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 14, 1990, at D2.
51. Grover Norquist, Alabamans Protect the GOP Brand, THE AM. ENTERPRISE, Dec. 2003,
at 48.
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two governors have subsequently been willing to actively support tax
increases. The spectacular failure of both governors to achieve their
goals is instructive as a lesson in tax policy, in politics, and in
democracy.
In September 2003, Alabama Governor Bob Riley, a Republican,
attempted to pass a state constitutional amendment that would have
raised state taxes by $1.2 billion.52 After years in business, Governor
Riley had served three terms in the House of Representatives as one of
Newt Gingrich's lieutenants.53 As a member of the House, Governor
Riley was once cited as its most conservative member; nonetheless, as
Governor of Alabama, he was persuaded that a revenue increase was
needed to close a nearly $700 million state budget shortfall as well as to
shore up Alabama's 50th rank in per pupil school spending.
54
Governor Riley did not stint in his support of the tax increase. He
attempted to act because he believed Alabama taxpayers would support
an increase to make the Alabama tax system more progressive, to pay
for schools, and to balance the budget.55 Relying on his impeccable
conservative credentials to support the tax, Governor Riley claimed that
"Jesus of Nazareth would want this tax hike" and that it was un-
Christian to forgo support for public schools.
56
While Governor Riley could have anticipated some opposition to his
proposal, it is a safe bet that he was taken aback by the reaction. The
tenor of the resulting firestorm is captured by a telephone call made to a
political columnist by the head of the Christian Coalition of Alabama,
who claimed that "the very same people who took the [Ten
Commandments] out of the judicial building are now trying to raise
your taxes."57 The President of Americans for Tax Reform was less
kind; he saw Governor Riley as an example to be avoided and
presumably deserving of some unnamed dire fate if he insisted on
"steal[ing] a billion dollars from [the] people." 58
52. John Mercurio, George W. Bush Giveth, Bob Riley Taketh Away, CNN.COM, Sept. 9,
2003, http://www.cnn.comV2003/ALLPOLITICS/09/O9/mgrind.day.riley.
53. Josh Patashnik, In the Jungle: A Political Perspective-Why the GOP Isn't Serious About
Budget Cuts, HARVARD INDEP., Mar. 3, 2005, available at http://www.harvardindependent.com
news/2005/03/03/Forumln.The.Jungle.A.Political.Perspective-885385.shtml.
54. Id.
55. Norquist, supra note 51, at 48.
56. Id.; Patashnik, supra note 53.
57. Bill Schneider, Voters Crush Alabama Tax Hike Proposal, CNN.COM, Sept. 15, 2003,
http://edition.cnn.comV2003/ALLPOLITICS/09/15/ip.pol.opinion.alabama.voters.
58. Mercurio, supra note 52.
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With this opposition, Alabama voters rejected Governor Riley's
proposal by greater than a two-to-one margin.59 Not surprisingly,
Governor Riley spent a significant time before his reelection bid in 2006
tending to the wreckage caused by his tax proposal. 60 The Governor
discovered that there is a heavy price to pay by pursuing the cause of
fiscal responsibility-however well-justified it might be.61
Undaunted but perhaps informed by his colleague's experience in
Alabama, in early 2005 Indiana's Republican Governor Mitch Daniels
attempted to pass a one year, one percentage point tax hike for those
earning over $100,000 a year (the top six percent in Indiana). 62
Governor Daniels was an executive with Eli Lilly before joining the
Office of Management and Budget, where he earned the nickname "the
Blade" for the budget cuts he sought during his tenure. 63 Governor
Daniels was dealing with a serious state fiscal crisis. For the 2005 fiscal
year, Indiana faced a $645 million budget deficit.64 Adding to its woes,
Indiana had exhausted whatever accounting tricks were available to
meet the state constitutional balanced budget requirement. 65
Like Governor Riley, Governor Daniels tried to take the offensive.
First, he announced his proposal to increase taxes in his inaugural
gubernatorial address, in which he asked "the most fortunate among us,
those citizens earning over $100,000 per year," to shoulder the burden
coupled with a pledge that the increase would last but one year.66 He
followed up with an editorial in a major Indiana newspaper in which he
tried to make the case for a tax increase in a methodical and logical
way.67 In his editorial, he cited the budget shortfall in the face of a poor
economy, stated that discretionary spending had been reduced to the
extent possible, cited the inefficacy of further accounting gimmicks
with the balanced budget requirement, stated that the tax would affect
only one in twenty taxpayers, and vowed that the tax increase was
59. Schneider, supra note 57.
60. Mercurio, supra note 52.
61. Schneider, supra note 57.
62. Mitch Daniels, Op-Ed., To Balance the Budget, State Must Balance the Burden,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 20, 2005, at I E.
63. id.; see also Epiphany on the Road to Indiana, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 24, 2005, at A22.
64. Dan Gilgoff, Hoosier Hysteria over Taxes: Back Home in Indiana, Has the Governor
Betrayed Conservatives?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 7, 2005, at 24, 24.
65. Id.
66. Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Indiana Governor, State of the State Address (Jan. 18, 2005),
available at http://www.in.gov/gov/2530.htm.
67. Daniels, supra note 62, at I E.
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temporary. 68 He also invoked his constitutional duty to the fiscal health
of the state and, by inference, appealed to the patriotic duty of Indiana
taxpayers. 69
Like his Alabama colleague, Governor Daniels quickly incurred the
wrath of the President of Americans for Tax Reform, who accused the
Governor of "papering over Indiana's problems" by focusing on raising
taxes instead of reducing spending. 70 His reputation as "the Blade" did
not insulate him from the wrath of his former supporters. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, Governor Daniels' proposal received little support in the
Indiana House of Representatives. 71 Undaunted by this lack of support,
Governor Daniels then sought to raise revenue by increasing the
cigarette tax.72 While his effort to increase the cigarette tax failed
initially, a cigarette tax was ultimately enacted into law. 73 Perhaps
mindful that he is up for reelection in 2008, Governor Daniels has more
recently attempted to limit the rates of increase in property taxation.74
This proposal seems to be facing a positive prospect before the Indiana
legislature. 75
Both Governor Riley and Governor Daniels are Republicans. Neither
of them could be described as advocates of tax increases. Indeed, both
had been at the forefront of anti-tax fervor. With the governors'
backgrounds, there are some who see their respective dilemmas as
deliciously ironic.76 However, both face real difficulties that have no
easy solution. Ultimately, they, like President George H.W. Bush, find
themselves painted in a corner by what has been characterized as the
"Republican Brand"-the no new taxes pledge. 77
68. Id. Like Governor Riley, Governor Daniels also invoked the memory of President
Reagan, -vho was forced to ask for a tax increase in his first year as governor of California. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Mary Beth Schneider & Kevin Corcoran, Budget Balancing Act: I Year Tax Increase,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 19, 2005, at Al.
72. Fred Barnes, Hoosier Jump Shot, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2007, at A8.
73. Highlights of Past State of the State Addresses by Gov. Mitch Daniels, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Jan. 15, 2008, at A4.
74. Amy Merrick, Politics & Economics: Property-Tax Frustration Builds-States, Cities
Revise Strategy as Homeowners Protest Rising Levies, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2007, at A6.
Governor Daniels' property tax plan is presented in detail on the Governor's website at
http://www.in.gov/gov/3105.htm.
75. Crystal Garcia, Property Tax 'Game' About to Get Started, TRIBUNE-STAR, Mar. 9, 2008,
http://www.tribstar.com/local/local-story-068214915.html.
76. Patashnik, supra note 53.
77. Norquist, supra note 51.
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C. The Judiciary
The judiciary is particularly ill-suited to take on the burden of dealing
with tax policy because it faces a number of structural impediments in
its ability to craft policy. First, the primary role of courts is to reconcile
tax legislation with constitutional prescriptions. In that role, the courts
can affect tax policy only by invalidating tax legislation on
constitutional grounds. 78  In the tax context, this is seldom done.
Moreover, when invalidating legislation on constitutional grounds, the
judicial function "is not subject to 'correction' by the ordinary
legislative process." 79 The formulation of a rational tax policy requires
an ability to react that is not so constrained.
Second, the courts can affect tax legislation in their role as referees
by giving their interpretation to tax legislation that is ambiguous.
However, such a limited role allows the judiciary to do little more than
react to legislation.
It follows that courts have traditionally favored a large degree of
judicial deference with regard to law-making. Beyond the foregoing,
the philosophy is explained by the view that "even improvident
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that
judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely
[a court] might think a political branch has acted."'80 There is a certain
fallacy in the model that relies on election of lawmakers to cure defects
in the tax system, and this idea has always struck me as devoid of a
connection with the real world. Voting is more complex than the single
issue of taxation. Not all voters vote on the basis of inequities in the tax
system. Voters rarely prioritize candidate choice based on a critical
analysis of a candidate's tax policy. 81
The Supreme Court's reticence to intrude into tax matters seems to
extend even to its deference to the United States Tax Court. As Justice
78. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 4 (1980) (discussing judicial review generally and the power it affords the courts).
79. Id.
80. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1992) (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97
(1979)).
81. In each of several polls conducted on the issue, the relative unimportance of taxes is clear.
Several polls suggest that Americans are more likely to view various other issues such as the
economy, Iraq, and social security as "extremely important." See e.g., CNN/Opinion Research
Corporation Poll (June 26-29, 2008), available at http://www.pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm. See
also Time Poll conducted by Abt SRBI (June 18-25, 2008), available at
http://www.pollingreport.comlprioriti.htm; CBS News Poll (July 31-Aug. 5, 2008), available at
http://www.pollingreport.comlprioriti.htm
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Jackson once famously explained, the Tax Court might be "a more
competent and steady influence toward a systematic body of tax law
than [the Supreme Court's] sporadic omnipotence in a field beset with
invisible boomerangs." 82
Even without this deference to lawmaking and to specialty courts, the
courts have always expressed a reluctance to invalidate tax legislation.
As I have noted elsewhere, the Supreme Court protects the
government's power to tax by setting extremely high thresholds for
striking down a tax as unconstitutional and by narrowly construing any
claims that its power of taxation is limited in any significant way.83
Still, it forms no principled basis for justifying a greater judicial role in
formulating tax policy.
A number of scholars have gently suggested a wider role for the
judiciary. Professor Daniel Shaviro's vague encouragement to courts to
adopt a broad theory of judicial interpretation strikes me as inadequate
to the task.84 I have no quarrel with a broad judicial power to interpret,
and I do not question the courts' ability, in Judge Calabresi's view, to
allow judges to "shape our law, at least at the level of making
conditional rules that can be revised by legislatures." 85 The problem
remains that the judiciary performs a reactive role. Even with Judge
Calabresi's expansive view of judicial power, no court can actually craft
or be instrumental in crafting tax policy. This is reminiscent of
Professor Kirk Stark's criticism of the initiative and referendum
processes to the effect that each is done without an analytic
framework.86 Courts lack the requisite analytic framework to formulate
tax policy, and there is simply not enough play in the joints to allow a
court to perform this function. For this last reason and for the reasons
articulated above, the inevitable conclusion is that the judiciary is not
the cause and cannot be a solution to the mess of tax policy.
82. Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 12 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
83. Leo P. Martinez, To Lay and Collect Taxes: The Constitutional Case for Progressive
Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 111, 134 (1999); see also Eduardo Penalver, Regulatory
Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2198 (2004).
84. Shaviro, supra note 3, at 113-14.
85. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 92-93 (1982).
86. Kirk J. Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 Nw. U.L. Rev. 191, 192 (2001) (citing
GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 189 (1980)).
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D. The People as Collective Sovereign
The public seems largely ignorant of how taxes work. Decisions are
made by voters without a full appreciation of what is at stake. Existing
commentary on the public's perceptions of tax systems demonstrate that
the popular concept of taxation diverges significantly from reality. It is
nothing short of surprising to observe the extent to which intelligent
people misperceive taxes and the system of taxation. 87 Professors
Steven M. Sheffrin and Marjorie Kornhauser have stated flatly at
different times that public opinion is ill-informed on tax matters.8 8 The
ignorance is observable at the retail level and at the wholesale level.
At the retail level, in one prominent study, Michael Roberts and
Peggy Hite discovered that, though the public may believe current
taxation to be unfair, when asked to specify what rate structure would be
fair based on income, respondents tended to choose rates similar to
those actually in place. 89 This is a remarkable outcome. The public
seems only to understand taxes enough to know that they do not like
them, and the public might not understand the purpose or the rationale
of the tax system, yet the public is somehow able to intuit an equitable
rate structure.
An example of the irrationality underlying United States tax policy at
the wholesale level emerges when one examines which states benefit
the greatest from federal spending and which states benefit the least. In
a New York Times editorial, Daniel H. Pink described states that
received less than a dollar back from the federal government for every
tax dollar their citizens contributed in taxes as "givers" (net losers) and
states who pocketed more than a dollar for every tax dollar their citizens
sent to Washington as "takers" (net winners). 90
Pink based his observations on a 2004 Special Report published by
the Tax Foundation.9 1 According to the report, for fiscal year 2003,
87. Marvin A. Chirelstein, The Flat Tax Proposal - Will Voters Understand the Issues?, 2
GREEN BAG 2d 147, 147-48 (1999).
88. Marjorie Kornhauser, Educating Ourselves Towards a Progressive (and Happier) Tax, 45
B.C. L. REV. 1399, 1403-04 (2004) (noting that few taxpayers understand the concept of
progressive taxation); Steven M. Sheffrin, What Does the Public Believe About Tax Fairness?, 46
NAT'L. TAX J. 301, 303 (1993) (pointing out examples of popular misconceptions about
particular aspects of taxation); see also JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A
CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 61-62 (2d ed. 2000).
89. Michael L. Roberts & Peggy Hite, Progressive Taxation, Fairness, and Compliance, 16
J.L. & POL'Y 27, 32 (1994).
90. Daniel H. Pink, Givers and Takers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2004, at A25.
91. Id.
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New Mexico was the biggest "taker" in terms of federal outlays
received relative to federal tax burden. For each $1.00 New Mexico's
taxpayers paid to Uncle Sam, they received a windfall of $1.99 in return
in federal expenditures.92  Other federally favored states included
Alaska ($1.89), Mississippi ($1.83), and West Virginia ($1.82). 93
Conversely, the biggest "giver" states were New Jersey, who was
rewarded a paltry $.57 cents for every $1.00, followed by New
Hampshire ($.64), Connecticut ($.65), and Minnesota ($.70). 9 4
Paradoxically, of the top ten states benefiting from generous federal
expenditures, nine of them are "red" states who supported President
George W. Bush in the 2004 election.95 Those states generally favored
low taxes and limited government spending. By contrast, eight out of
the top ten states whose tax burdens exceeded federal outlays are the
92. Sumeet Sagoo, Tax Foundation Special Report No. 132: Federal Tax Burdens and
Expenditures by State: Which States Gain Most from Federal Fiscal Operations?, TAX FOUND.,
Dec. 2004, at 3; see also Curtis S. Dubay, Tax Foundation Special Report No. 139: Federal Tax
Burdens and Expenditures by State: Which States Gain Most from Federal Fiscal Operations?,
TAX FOUND., Mar. 2006, at 3.
93. Sagoo, supra note 92, at 3.
94. Id.
95. The table below summarizes the results from the cited works. Dubay, supra note 92, at 3;
Sagoo, supra note 92, at 3.
Top Ten Beneficiary States (by ratio of federal spending received to federal tax burden)
Sagoo's 2004 Article Dubay's 2006 Article
"Red"f'Blue" "Red"/'Blue"
State State State State
North Dakota $1.75 Red North Dakota $1.73 Red
Montana $1.80 Red Montana $1.58 Red
New Mexico $1.99 Red New Mexico $2.00 Red
Kentucky $1.52 Red South Dakota $1.49 Red
Mississippi $1.83 Red Mississippi $1.77 Red
Alabama $1.69 Red Alabama $1.71 Red
West Virginia $1.82 Red West Virginia $1.83 Red
Virginia $1.58 Red Virginia $1.66 Red
Alaska $1.89 Red Alaska $1.87 Red
Hawaii $1.50 Blue Hawaii $1.60 Blue
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"blue" states that historically have supported increased federal
spending.96
In the aggregate, seventeen states ostensibly serve as benefactors to
thirty-one states who are beneficiaries of federal largesse (two states,
Oregon and Florida, have a perfect balance of taxes paid and spending
received). With the exception of Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Nevada,
and Texas, the remaining twelve "giver" states are blue (among which
are California, New York, and Illinois). Conversely, of the thirty-one
beneficiary states, only seven (Hawaii, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Maine) are blue. The net effect
is a tax system that geographically redistributes wealth predominantly
from the middle class of blue states, who support higher taxes and
increased spending, to the middle class of red states, who fiercely
oppose expansive tax policy and liberal government expenditures.
Another example of taxpayers' irrationality with respect to tax policy
is found in California. In 1978, the voters of California used the
initiative process-acting in their capacity as sovereign, to use
Professor Christian G. Fritz's term again-to pass Proposition 13, the
poster child for the shortcomings of direct democracy. 97 Proposition 13
amended the California Constitution and had the effect of limiting
property taxes in several ways.98 First, it fixed the valuation of property
96. The table below summarizes the results from the cited works. Dubay, supra note 92, at 3;
Sagoo, supra note 92, at 3.
Top Ten Benefactor States (by ratio of federal spending received to federal tax burden)
Sagoo's 2004 Article Dubay's 2006 Article
"Red"P'Blue" "Red"/"Blue"
State State State State
Minnesota $.70 Blue Minnesota $.69 Blue
California $.78 Blue California $.79 Blue
Nevada $70 Red Nevada $.73 Red
Colorado $.80 Red Colorado $.79 Red
Illinois $73 Blue Illinois $73 Blue
New York $.80 Blue New York $.79 Blue
New Hampshire $.64 Blue New Hampshire $.67 Blue
Massachusetts $78 Blue Massachusetts $.77 Blue
Delaware $.82 Blue Connecticut $.66 Blue
New Jersey $.57 Blue New Jersey $.55 Blue
97. See K.K. DuVivier, Ballot Initiatives and Referenda: Out of the Bottle: The Genie of
Direct Democracy, 70 ALB. L. REv. 1045 (2007) (providing a crisp description of direct
democracy); Stark, supra note 86, at 192 (describing Proposition 13 as a "fiscal earthquake").
98. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
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to its original purchase price. Second, it fixed property tax rates at one
percent of valuation. Finally, it imposed a two percent cap on annual
increases in assessed valuation.
Because the value of California property has increased over time at a
rate that far exceeded the two percent cap, a large disparity in property
taxes paid by homeowner quickly resulted. For example, if I purchased
my home in 1981 for $200,000, it was subject to a property tax of
$2,000. This $2,000 was subject to an annual increase of two percent.
By the year 2005, the value of my home might very well be on the order
of $1 million. If, in 2005, my neighbor purchased the house adjoining
mine for its fair market value of $1 million, that house would be subject
to an annual property tax of $10,000. In my case, even with an annual
property tax increase of two percent, my property taxes would not have
even doubled in the same twenty-four year period. Thus, even though
my neighbor and I own essentially identical homes and consume
essentially identical amounts in fire, police, and other infrastructure
expenditures, my neighbor pays nearly three times the property taxes
that I pay.
This disparity resulted in the celebrated Nordlinger v. Hahn.99 In
Nordlinger, Stephanie Nordlinger, a California property owner,
challenged the Proposition 13 scheme.100 Her complaint was that she
paid approximately four times the property taxes that her neighbor in a
similar house paid.' 0 ' Her neighbor's lower property taxes were based
on an acquisition cost that was one-fourth of her purchase price. 10 2
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Proposition
13 in an opinion by Justice Blackmun.10 3 Justice Stevens' dissent
criticized the inequities created by Proposition 13.104 He pointed out,
for example, that there were instances in which some homeowners paid
as much as seventeen times as much in property taxes compared to
those with similar property. 10 5 Not surprisingly, he characterized the
system as irrational, concluding that "the severe inequities created by
Proposition 13 [were] arbitrary and unreasonable and [did] not
99. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
100. Id. at 7-8.
101. Id. at 7.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 18.
104. Id. at 28-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 29.
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rationally further a legitimate state interest." 10 6  He was the lone
dissenter.
The Nordlinger case neatly makes two of my points. First, the
Supreme Court demonstrates that poor tax policy is not within the
Court's ability to police. Second, the people, in their sovereign
capacity, are poor crafters of tax policy. Taxpayers are plagued with
cognitive biases and misperceptions that cloud the ability of economic
theory to predict their behavior. 10 7 The real point is that taxpayers do
not always make good-read: rational-choices about their tax
behavior. 108
Perhaps validating Professor Daniel Shaviro's observation that
wealth-maximization principles are insufficient to explain taxpayer
behavior, 10 9 it is evident that pocket-book concerns do not explain the
anti-tax sentiment in the gaining red states as it does not explain the
tolerance for taxes in the losing blue states. Paul Krugman has made
essentially the same observation citing the divergence of economic
interest and political views. I 10
Similarly inexplicable is Californians' seemingly blind allegiance to
Proposition 13, despite the possibility of fifty-to-one disparities in
property tax obligations. It does not take particular insight to guess
what Justice Stevens would think about Proposition 13 today some
thirteen years after still more appreciation of California real estate.
Justice Stevens would not be alone in his criticism of Proposition 13.
No less than Warren Buffett himself, as the informal financial advisor to
now Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, criticized Proposition 13,
noting that the system made no sense.11 1I Yet despite the disparities
created by Proposition 13, the gross imbalance in property taxes for
similar properties, the high prices created in part by the lack of turnover
in properties, and the decline in school funding, there is little support for
106. Id. at 30.
107. Galle, supra note 17, at 808-09 (providing an excellent analysis of the overall problem of
tax policy failings in the context of a particular Code provision); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
The Report of the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform: A Critical Assessment and
a Proposal, 59 SMU L. REV. 551, 561 (2006) (discussing the proposition that individuals do not
always behave rationally).
108. Galle, supra note 17, at 815-18. Professor Brian Galle makes the point that in some
cases, the "choice" that depends on geography is really not available to most taxpayers. Id. at
814.
109. Shaviro, supra note 3, at 8.
110. PAUL KRUGMAN, FUzzY MATH: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO THE BUSH TAX PLAN 15
(2001).
Ill. Tim Rutten, Unwelcome Lightfrom Buffett's Star, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2003, at El.
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Warren Buffett's view. In a state where neighbors consume the same in
police and fire protection while paying vastly different property taxes,
the hue and cry is to preserve Proposition 13 and not abandon it. 112
If even Warren Buffett's considerable financial acumen is insufficient
to persuade California taxpayers that Proposition 13 makes no sense,
more is at play. Some hint is perhaps given by Governor
Schwarzenegger's quip that "[t]he public doesn't care about figures. '" 113
Ultimately, the public must care about figures if the republic is to
survive.
III. WHAT TO Do
The true difficulty in dealing with tax policy is deciding what to do.
Tax policy is a complex calculus that involves the role of government
and social welfare. Reliance on economic theory is not necessarily the
answer. Economics is simply an analytical tool that does not
necessarily provide solutions to difficult problems. 114 Reliance on a
free market to sort things out will not necessarily achieve an equitable
outcome.1 15 Indeed, almost twenty years ago, Professor Daniel Shaviro
suggested that the extant explanations for the course of tax policy did
not account for "how self-interested political behavior apart from wealth
maximization shapes legislative outcomes."' 1 16
President George W. Bush took a well-worn path by naming a Tax
Advisory Panel to create a simpler and fairer tax system that recognizes
the importance of homeownership and charity. 117 The bipartisan panel
held hearings and reported back to the President at the end of July
2005.118 Those with long memories should be reminded of the use of
112. Id.
113. Paul Krugman, Conan the Deceiver, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2003, at A23.
114. See WHEELAN, supra note 40, at 41 (stating that "economics does not give us a 'right
answer'-only an analytical framework for thinking about important questions").
115. /d.at5l.
116. Shaviro, supra note 3, at 8.
117. See generally Exec. Order. No. 13369, 70 Fed. Reg. 2323 (Jan. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/executive-order.shtml. The consequent report was issued in late
2005 and it proposed two alternatives: a simplified income tax and a consumption-like tax. THE
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, & PRO-GROWTH:
PROPOSALS TO Fix AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM (2005); see also Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Federal
Tax Reform and Reducing the Bush Deficit by $800 Billion, 110 TAX NOTES 1486 (2006).
Neither proposal has been acted on. Id.
118. Thompson, supra note 117, at 1486.
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panels to attempt to resolve other knotty problems, including base
closures and sentencing guidelines.
119
Whether it was possible that the Panel could have accomplished
anything meaningful is open to debate. One Panel member announced
early on that the Panel's goal was not consensus but the creation of
alternatives. 120 Others criticized the Panel's approach that limited the
consideration of the deduction for personal residence interest and for
charitable contributions. 121 It is perhaps a sad comment on democracy
if our elected officials cannot deal with a knotty problem without
passing the responsibility to others in the guise of a "panel." It is not
surprising that the Panel's recommendations have gone nowhere.
122
Some academics, including me, have suggested that an informed
electorate is the answer. 123 However, it is not entirely clear whether an
informed electorate, while hugely useful to rational tax policy, is a
realistic goal. 124 In his book The Tipping Point, Malcolm Gladwell
posits that small stimuli can have huge effects. 125 In particular, he notes
that the populace is susceptible to subtle influences of which those
being influenced may not be aware. 126 An informal observation might
be that the whole body of consumer marketing is based on this premise.
This is all the more dangerous because irrationality can be selective and
those who are so inclined can prey on this tendency. 127  A public,
119. While I make light of this approach, it is not completely irrational to attempt to take
thorny decisions out of the hands of partisans. See Shaviro, supra note 3, at 114-15.
120. Id.
121. Edmund L. Andrews, Bush Names 2 Ex-Senators To Consider Tax Changes, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, at A17.
122. David Leonhardt, Untangling Housing and Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2008, at Cl; see
also Thompson, supra note 117, at 1486; Avi-Yonah, supra note 107, at 574-86 (setting forth a
comprehensive analysis of the Panel's report); Christopher H. Hanna, Tax Theories and Tax
Reform, 59 SMU L. Rev. 435 (2006) (discussing the twin recommendations of the panel, a
modified version of the current income tax system and a partial consumption tax system).
123. E.g., Kornhauser, supra note 88, at 1401; Leo P. Martinez, Tax Legislation and
Democratic Discourse: The Rhetoric of Revenue and Politics, 4 NEV. L.J. 510, 517 (2004);
Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REV. 919, 990
(1997).
124. Shaviro, supra note 3, at 112 (expressing pessimism about the possibility of an informed
electorate).
125. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT (2000).
126. Id. at 74-80 (citing subtle mannerisms by a news anchor on a national election).
Professor Marjorie Kornhauser suggests that cognitive psychology theory can inform popular
attitudes about tax and tax policy. Kornhauser, supra note 88, at 1404; see also Edward J.
McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861 (1994). Professor McCaffrey
observes that framing how an issue is presented can have dramatic effects. Id. at 1915.
127. BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE
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under-informed on tax issues, may not understand what policies a
lawmaker stands for, or worse, may not care. A discussion of more than
superficial tax policy is seldom at the forefront of the political debate.
Thus, tax policy is susceptible to being influenced by ideology despite
intellectual dishonesty.128 Moreover, economist Charles Wheelan notes
that organized interests can skew legislation because the masses of
those who are not interested have so little at stake. 129 In addition, a
single vote counts for so little that a taxpayer feels justified in paying
little heed to voting responsibly. 130 It is not surprising, then, that the
Code is so littered with tax policy inconsistencies.
Governor Daniels, a disciple of Karl Rove, apparently took
Gladwell's and Kornhauser's suggestions to heart when he attempted to
shape the debate on his tax increase. Yet, despite his attempts, he failed
to sway either public opinion or the Indiana House of Representatives.
His experience, certainly, was a triumph of taxpayer/voter incompetence
over process and informed decision-making. It also demonstrated that
the theory of cognitive psychology is far from working its magic in this
arena.
It is easy to let a certain amount of pessimism contaminate the
realistic hope for rational tax policy. Dr. Peter C. Whybrow argues in
his book, American Mania: When More is Not Enough, that the rise of a
selfish kind of individualism can be attributed to a weakened social
fabric. 131 Whybrow believes that in the earlier days of the republic the
American disposition to self-interest was tempered by a sense of
community; over time, this sense of community has diminished with a
consequent rise in self-interest. 132 Ironically, some have observed that
the federal tax policy that encouraged the shopping center boom also
contributed to the demise of the positive social effects of neighborhood
restaurants and shops. 133
BAD POLICIES 2-3 (2007).
128. KRUGMAN, supra note 110, at 8.
129. WHEELAN, supra note 40, at 137-38. Professor Bryan Caplan posits that it is possible
for a small number of the electorate who are keenly interested in a particular outcome to hold
sway where the remaining members of the electorate simply don't care about an outcome and
simply vote randomly. CAPLAN, supra note 127, at 6-9.
130. CAPLAN, supra note 127, at 6-9.
131. PETER C. WHYBROW, AMERICAN MANIA: WHEN MORE IS NOT ENOUGH 36 (2005).
132. Id. at 36-37.
133. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 288 (2000).
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IV. CONCLUSION
It is possible that the various inconsistencies in the Code may mask a
grand design so that they even out in the wash as a sort of rough justice.
Indeed, assuming a random distribution of inefficiencies and
inconsistencies, this idea may even be demonstrable. Still, rough justice
is a poor substitute for a rational, uniformly applied system of taxation.
It is difficult not to feel pessimistic about the prospects of an informed
electorate capable of initiating meaningful change. Marjorie
Kornhauser's eloquent turn of phrase, "[t]ax debates have always been a
forum in which Americans explore the nature of their government,"',
34
seems a good note to strike. In a country founded upon the outspoken
voices of colonial opposition to burdensome taxes, it seems that the
modem populace has forgotten its historical involvement and has
allowed incoherent tax policy to flourish.
Former Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Mortimer M.
Caplin, in an essay titled The Tax Lawyer's Role in the Way the
American Tax System Works, has suggested that the proper functioning
of the tax system depends on the responsible involvement of tax lawyers
and tax accountants. 135 My judgment is that Commissioner Caplin's
aim is too narrow. While I agree with his premise, the responsibility he
discusses belongs to all and is not the narrow province of lawyers and
accountants. Perhaps the broad conclusion is that the systematic
irrationality and incoherence of tax policy has the deleterious effect of
damaging compliance with the tax system. Irrationality and
incoherence, in the words of one commentator, combine to "[hobble]
goodwill towards Congress (or the legislative process, etc.) as a
motivation for compliance."' 136 We can do better.
134. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax
Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 829 (2002).
135. Mortimer M. Caplin, The Tax Lawyer's Role in the Way the American Tax System
Works, 106 TAX NOTES 697, 700 (2005).
136. Spica, supra note 5, at 221.
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